Based on the ideas of quantum physics and dual-process theory of human reasoning that takes into account two primary mechanisms of reasoning : 1) deductive rational thinking and 2) intuitive heuristic judgment, we proposed the "quantum" approach to practical human logic that allows one to specify the most distinctive peculiarities in activity of two reasoning systems mentioned above and in addition to describe phenomenologically well-established experimentally belief-bias effect .
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that some essential human values and concepts may be incompatable with each other had originated long before the beginning of scientific psychology. By distinct ways this idea was justified by such outstanding philosophers and thinkers as G.W. Leibniz, N.Machiavelli and I. Kant. The interested reader can find detail account of the history of this idea with relevant references in [1] . However only in the XX century with the rise of quantum theory this idea has received adequate scientific expression in the language of the Bohr's Complementarity Principle. We shall give here only two distinctive quotations of founding fathers of quantum mechanics that are clearly demonstrating their profound understanding of the inconsistancy of some basic concepts relating to human psychology. So, in the paper of 1948 "On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity" N. Bohr wrote:"Recognition of complementary relationship is not least required in psychology, where the conditions for analysis and synthesis of experience exhibit striking analogy with the situation in atomic physis. In fact, the use of words like thoughts, and sentiments, equally indispensable to illustrate the diversity of psychical experience, pertain to mutually exclusive situations characterized by a different drawing of the line of separation between subject and object. In particular, the place left for the feeling of volition is afforded by the very circumstance that situations where we experience freedom of will are incompatible with psychological situations where causal analysis is reasonably attempted. In other words, when we use the phrase "I will" we renounce explanatory argumentation. In fact, the use which we make of words like "thought" and "feeling," or "instinct" and "reason" to describe psychic experiences of different types, shows the existence of characteristic relationships of complementarity conditioned by the peculiarity of introspection" [2] . On the other hand W.Pauli drew particular attention to the problem of relation between complementarity of mental and physical aspects of the same reality. In his * Electronic address: vol@ilt.kharkov.ua inspiring paper "The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler" [2] he wrote:" "The general problem of the relationship between psyche and physics, between inside and outside, will hardly be solved with the notion of a 'psychophysical parallelism, put forward in the past century. However, modern science has perhaps brought us closer to a more satisfying conception of this relationship insofar as it introduced the concept of complementarity within physics. It would be most satisfactory if physis and psyche could be conceived as complementary aspects of the same reality.".Unfortunately at the time these deep ideas are not influenced the development of experimental psychology. All the more remarkable that modern cognitive psychology irrespectively came in fact to the similar conclusions.In particular numerous experts in so different areas of cognitive psychology as attention,memory,decision making, learning with one accord believe that dual processes and dual systems play fundamental role for nearly all basic cognitive mechanisms in human mind (see e.g. [4] for brief review of dual-process theory in reasoning with the list of necessary references).In what follows we are interested only in human reasoning where two primary dual systems of interest can be specified. One of these systems we will call it below as deductive reasoning system (DRS) is rational, sequental and consistent but acts relatively slow while the other -we will call it further as heuristic reasoning system (HRS) is intuitive, fast, automatic, but to a large extent influenced by emotions and last unconsious experience.Numerous researches and experiments conclusively proved that there is hidden interaction between these two cognitive systems such that a reasoning subject is not aware of this.The belief-bias effect is the most striking manifestation of such interaction. Roughly speaking the belief-bias effect is the innate tendency of reasoning subjects to be more likely to accept reasons ang arguments if they find them believable and to pay less attention of their logical validity. The main goal of present paper is based on quantum ideas of complementarity and dual-process theory in human reasoning to describe the belief-bias effect phenomenologically by purely logical tools. To this end we will use also the simplified version of discrete-continuous logic that was formulated earlier in author preprint [5] .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we briefly remind basic facts relating to discrete-continuous logic (DCL) that are necessary for the understanding of the present paper.The main contribution of this chapter is the interpretation of the general propositions in DCL as the integral mental structures that consist both of logical and heuristic constituents. Under such interpretation these two constituents of the proposition can be considered as complementary to each other exactly like two noncommuting observables in quantum mechanics.In chapter 3 we state the uncertainty relation that just reflects the complementary nature of such concepts as logical rigour and the heuristic grasp. And finally in chapter 4 using only logical tools we give the phenomenological explanation of the belief-bias effect. Now let us go to the details.
II. PRELIMINIRIES
In this part we briefly remind for the reader convenience the necessary facts relating to the discretecontinuous logic that were outlined more detail in author preprint [5] . So, we will consider as the primary objects of our study the set of general propositions (GP) -{A j } that may be represented by 2 × 2 positive definite matrices with unit trace of the following form:
(where i is imaginary unit). In this case the negation of such proposition -(not A j ) may be defined as (not
It turns out that in addition to negation another but already two place operation -△ (which is the analogue of strong disjunction in ordinary Boolean logic) can be introduced in DCL according to the next definition:
where
Comparing representation Eq. (1) with standard form of density matrix of the mixed state of two-level quantum system that looks as ρ = (where P = (P x , P y , P z ) is the Bloch vector of the state ) we see that GP may be represented by the similar way but in this case x− component of the Bloch vector is equal to zero. In the rest of the paper we will use such reduced Bloch representation for the arbitrary proposition A, that is:
with P = (P y , P z ). In this case it is convenient to introduce the complex vector P = P z − iP y which we call further as representating vector (RV) of proposition A. It is easy to verify directly that the RV of proposition (notA) is equal to (−P ) and RV of proposition (A △ B) is equal to (−P Q) (where Q is RV of B ).Note also the useful relation connecting negation with operation △:
. (3) It should be noted that unlike of ordinary Boolean logic in DCL it is possible to define the whole one-parameter group of continuous logical operations (logical rotations of propositions in the plane P y − P z ) according to the following rule: if proposition A has the RV -P then rotated at an angle Φ proposition A 1 has RV -P 1 with components:
It is easy to see that the negation of any proposition coincides with logical rotation of it at an angle π and in addition that if one rotates the GP A at an angle Φ 1 and the other proposition B at an angle Φ 2 then the proposition (A △ B) will be rotated at an angle Φ 1 + Φ 2 . Thus all logical operations in DCL obtain quite clear geometric meaning. Now after describing the syntax of DCL we can pass to the more difficult task: clarification of its semantics that is the interpretation both the meaning of general propositions and logical operations with them. It should be noted that interpretation that we are going to propose here is not the only possible but it is appropriate for our ultimate goal namely to explain the beliefe-bias effect in human reasoning from pure logical point of view. So, as before we will assume that diagonal elements of representing matrix for arbitrary GP describes degree of its logical validity (from DRS point of view) while its nondiagonal elements we will interpret as the believability of the same proposition inspired by the heuristic reasoning system (HRS). This interpretation can be expressed more precisely as follows. Let us introduce two projection operators:P 1 and P 2 P give us the propabilities of its logical plausability p t and its believability p b respectively.Thus we obtain
In connection with above interpretation we want to point out two important marginal GP: 1) T = 1 0 0 0 -
-highest possible believable proposition and their negations: F = (notT )−false proposition and U = (notB)-unbelievable proposition. Note in addition that noncommutativity of operators P 1 and P 2 implies that main predicates of arbitrary GP (plausibility and belief) may be considered as complementary (in the sence of quantum theory) aspects of the same proposition. This important fact implies specific uncertainty relation for the observables P 1 and P 2 connected with any GP. The simple derivation of these relation is the subject of the next section of the presenr paper.
III. THE UNCERTAINTY RELATION BETWEEN PREDICATES PLAUSIBILITY AND BELIEVABILITY IN DCL.
To derive the required uncertainty relation it is convenient to represent any GP A in the Bloch form: 
The notable fact should be mentioned here:if one takes two propositions A and B with RV P and Q respectively then according above calculation one can write two equa-
and 2)△p
On the other hand as we marked earlier the proposition (A △ B) has RV (−P Q) and hence its uncertainty is equal to △ p ) and hence as a final result of logical operation △ the ending uncertainty of proposition can only increases.We would like to hope that properly organized experiments with specially selected reasoning tasks will be able to confirm (or may be disprove) the proposed uncertainty relations (6).Now we come back to the main goal of present paper: the explanation of the belief-bias effect in human reasoning.
IV. MANY VALUED PROBABILISTIC LOGIC AND THE BELIEF-BIAS EFFECT.
In this part we will try to describe (phenomenologically) the belief-bias effect in human reasoning by purely logical tools.For this purpose it is convenient to use some version of probabilistic many-valued logic that in some sense can be considered as simplified version of original DCL.Really if in original version of DCL we restrict ourselves only by discrete set of logical rotations with angles: 0, 2π N ... N − 1) ). In the case when we are not interested in the "quantum correlations" between these marginal propositions we can consider them as approximately independent quantities and associate with these propositions the logical basis consisting of N distinct logical alternatives.Acting in this manner one can pass from original DCL to standard manyvalued probabilistic Boolean logic. After this remark we will examine further four valued probabilistic logic every proposition of which can be represented as 4 × 4 diagonal matrix : A = diag (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ).Here we mean that the space of these propositions is a tensor product of two spaces with 2 × 2 diagonal matrices, that is:
and
In addition we assume that matrices T i in the decomposition Eq. (7) are associated with the activity of deductive cognitive subsystem (DRS),while matrices B i are connected with its heuristic subsystem (HRS).Thus the basis of this logic consists of four propositions:1) truth-believable T B = diag(1, 0, 0, 0), 2) truth-unbelievable T U = diag(0, 1, 0, 0), 3)false-believable F B = diag(0, 0, 1, 0) and 4)false-unbelievable F U = diag(0, 0, 0, 1).Our next step is to define basic logical operations that can be implemented with such propositions. The interpetation that we have adopted above implies that the negation of proposition A must be defined as (notA) = diag (P 4 , P 3 , P 2 , P 1 ). The certain dilemma arises however when we want to define the conjunction of two propositions A = diag (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) and B = diag (Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , Q 4 ). We have proposed here the following definition:
. This definition of conjuction namely Eq.
( 
We see that conjunction in heuristic system differs from standatd logical conjunction .In our opinion this distinction explicitly reflects (from phenomenological point of view) the essential difference existing between two reasoning systems when they operate jointly. In particular the definition Eq. Thus we obtain that the unconditional belief when it conflicts with certain doubtful one always overcomes it. Now if one takes the expression Eq. (8) for granted then he (she)can define another logical operations (in particular implication that we especially interested in ) without any obstacles.To this end one should be guided by two relations of ordinary logic which as we assume continue to be valid in our case as well: 1) (AorB) = not [(notA) and (notB)] and 2) (A =⇒ B) = (notA) orB .Acting in this manner we obtain for the implication (A =⇒ B) the required relation:
The expression Eq. (10) for the implication of two probabilistic propositions in four-valued logic is the foundation for our following explanation of bias-belief effect.Note that here we are going to demonstrate only the simplest case of the application of the approach proposed. The detail quantitative analysis of numerous possible situations connected with the interaction between DRS and HRS will be realized by us at length in separate publication. So, let us take the proposition B-(consequent of the implication) in the form: B = diag (1, 0, 0, 0), that means that consequent is both true and believable proposition. Then the expression Eq. (10) implies that matrix (A =⇒ B) has the form:
and hence its projections in DRS (1) and HRS (2) systems are respectively : (A =⇒ B) 1 = 1 0 , and
On the other hand if one choose the consequent B in the form B = diag (0, 1, 0, 0) that means that consiquent B is true but unbelievable proposition then according to expression (10) one obtain for the implication (A =⇒ B) the relation:
and hence the projections of this proposition in two cognitive systems are:(A =⇒ B) 1 = 1 0 and
Now if we make the natural assumption that after the first ( unconscious) stage of reasoning, when two cognitive systems operate jointly, at the second stage the conscious evaluation of the validity of a conclusion V occurs in accordance with the simple rule:
(where a (0 a 1) is certain number coefficient depending on age,intellect,training of the subject and possibly some other factors).Note that this assumption in fact coincides with similar rule which was used in the paper [4] . Now returning to the above example of interest we result in that the magnitude of the bias-belief effect V can be evaluate quantitatively as V ≡ V 1 − V 2 = (1 − a) (p 2 + p 4 ).We believe that although the value of coefficient a is unknown in advance nevertheless the validity of the Eq. (13) can be explicitly verified in seria of properly organized psychological experiments with various subjects using the identical cognitive tasks .
In conclusion of our study let us formulate once more the central results of the present paper: 1)We introduced the novel version of DCL with both discrete and continuous logical operations between generalized propositions .
2)We proposed the concrete interpretation of propositions in DCL as integral mental structures that include both logical and heuristic constituents.
3)We stated the specific uncertainty relation between logic rigour and heuritic grasp that reflect complementary aspects of human reasoning process. 4)We proposed phenomenological model of human reasoning based on simplified version of DCL and demonstrated that it is able to explain belief-bias effect qualitatively and possibly quantitatively as well.
All these conclusions we hope to discuss more detail in our further publications.
